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16	PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA EX REL. ATTORNEY GENERAL XAVIER	Case No. 192487
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17	EX REL. ATTORNEY GENERAL XAVIER BECERRA,	DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT WESTLANDS WATER DISTRICT'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
17 18 19	EX REL. ATTORNEY GENERAL XAVIER BECERRA, Plaintiff and Petitioner,	DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT WESTLANDS WATER DISTRICT'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO
17 18 19 20	EX REL. ATTORNEY GENERAL XAVIER BECERRA, Plaintiff and Petitioner, v. WESTLANDS WATER DISTRICT AND DOES 1-20,	DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT WESTLANDS WATER DISTRICT'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION BY FAX
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1844148.5 2010-096

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1844148.5 2010-096

TABLE OF CONTENTS

2				Page	(s)
3	I.	INTR	ODUC'	TION	. 6
4 5	II.	CONS	SIDERA	OS' MOTION TO CHANGE VENUE PRECLUDES ATION OF THE AG'S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY N UNTIL THE VENUE MOTION IS DECIDED	. 7
6	III.	FACT	UAL E	BACKGROUND	. 7
7		A.	Westl	ands Water District	. 7
8		B.	Recla	mation Is Considering Raising Shasta Dam	. 9
9		C.	Westl Recla	ands Is Considering Whether To Contribute Funding For mation's Project	10
10 11	IV.	STAN	IDARD	FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION	10
12	V.	ARGI	JMEN	Γ	11
13		A.	Injund To Pr	ctive Relief Should Be Denied Because The AG Is Unlikely evail On The Merits	11
14 15			1.	Westlands' Study Of Potential Environmental Impacts Under CEQA Is Not "Planning" Prohibited By Public Resources Code Section 5093.542	11
16 17 18			2.	The AG Has Failed To Carry His Burden Of Proving That Raising Shasta Dam Could Adversely Affect The Free-Flowing Condition Of The McCloud River Or Its Wild Trout Fishery	14
19			3.	The Application Of Section 5093.542 Here Is Much More Involved Than The AG's Motion Presumes	15
20		В.		ctive Relief Should Be Denied Because The AG Has I To Show Injunctive Relief Is Needed To Avoid Irreparable Harm	16
22			2.	Public Agencies Have No Conflicting Duties Under CEQA And Section 5093.542	17
23 24			3.	Impacts From Construction Of The Shasta Dam Raise Project Are Too Remote To Support An Injunction	18
25		C.	The E	Balance of Hardships Weighs Against Injunctive Relief	19
26		D.	The F	Form Of Order Proposed By The AG Is Too Indefinite For An Injunction	19
27	VI.	CONCI	LUSIO	V	20
28					

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

2	Page(s)
3	Cases
4 5	Arce v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal. App. 4th 47114
6 7	Brady v. Times-Mirror Co. (1895) 106 Cal. 56
8	Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668
9 10	Casmalia Res., Ltd. v. Cty. of Santa Barbara (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 82711
11	Cohen v. Bd. of Supervisors (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 447
12 13	Common Cause of Cal. v. Bd. of Supervisors (1989) 49 Cal.3d 432
14 15	Costa Mesa City Employees Assn. v. City of Costa Mesa (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 298
16	County of Riverside v. Superior Court of San Diego County (1968) 69 Cal.2d 828
17 18	People ex rel. Feuer v. FXS Management, Inc., (2010) 2 Cal.App.5th 1154, 1157
19 20	IT Corp. v. County of Imperial (1983) 35 Cal.3d 63
21	Jessen v. Keystone Sav. & Loan Ass'n (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 454
22 23	Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of California (1988) 47 Cal.3d 376
24 25	Pickwick Stages System v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1934) 138 Cal.App.448
26	Pitchess v. Super. Ct. of Los Angeles County (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 644
27 28	S.F. Newspaper Printing Co. v. Superior Court (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 43810
	1844148.5 2010-096 MEMOR AND LIM OF POINTS AND ALITHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY

1	Tahoe Keys Property Owners' Ass'n v. State Water Res. Control Bd. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 145911
2 3	California Regulations
4	Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14 § 15002, subd.(e)
5	Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14
6	\[\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \
7	Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14
8	§ 15096, subd.(h)
9	California Statutes
10	CEQA Guideline
11	15002(e)
12	Evid. Code
13	§ 452(c)
14	§ 452(d)
15	Fish & G. Code
16	§ 7650(c)16
17	Pub. Resources Code § 5093.50.
18	§ 5093.52(d)
19	\$ 5093.542
20	
	Wat. Code § 37800
21	8 37800
22	Federal Statutes
23	16 U.S.C. § 1802(13)
24	WIIN Act
25	§ 40079
26	
27	
28	
	1844148.5 2010-096 5
	MEMORANDI IM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR PREI IMINARY

I. INTRODUCTION

Westlands Water District ("Westlands") is in the process of gathering and disseminating information and analysis to inform its later decision on whether it will become a cost share partner for a *possible* project the Unites States Bureau of Reclamation ("Reclamation") is considering - an 18 ½ foot raise of the existing Shasta Dam. Westlands is gathering and disseminating the information and analysis to ensure compliance with State law. The information will: (1) allow Westlands to assess whether the prohibition in California Public Resources Code section 5093.542 precludes Westlands from becoming a cost share partner, and (2) inform the Westlands' board and the public of the environmental effects of a decision by Westlands to become cost share partner, if one were made, as required by the California Environmental Quality Act ("CEQA"). The result of the process is still unknown, and any vote as to Westlands' provision of funding for Reclamation's project is uncertain. Even Reclamation has not made a determination as to whether it will implement the project. In his motion for preliminary injunction, however, the Attorney General ("AG") curiously seeks to stop Westlands from gathering and disseminating information to support an informed, and certainly not predetermined, decision.

The AG fails to meet his burden of demonstrating either a likelihood of success on the merits, or that the balance of irreparable harm tips in his favor to justify such injunction. The AG wrongly contends that Westlands is bound by prior factual findings and legal conclusions expressed in an environmental impact statement prepared by a federal agency relating to application of state law, and which consist entirely of inadmissible hearsay. Westlands has an obligation to conduct an independent investigation. Moreover, the harm to the public interest caused by barring collection of such information and preventing public input weighs against granting the injunction.

The Court should deny the AG's Motion and maintain the status quo by permitting Westlands to complete an environmental review under CEQA and develop the information and analysis necessary to inform Westlands and the public of the potential impacts of enlarging Shasta Dam and Reservoir. The concerns expressed by the AG in this action could be unrealized, depending on the information and analysis developed by Westlands and/or if Westlands decides not to contribute funding. Ultimately, if it decides to contribute funding, the AG may pursue his challenge 1844148.5 2010-096

with the information and analysis developed through the process Westlands is following.

II. WESTLANDS' MOTION TO CHANGE VENUE PRECLUDES CONSIDERATION OF THE AG'S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION UNTIL THE VENUE MOTION IS DECIDED

On June 12, 2019, Westlands filed motions to transfer this matter, and a related matter, to Fresno County Superior Court. The two motions to change venue are set to be heard on July 22, 2019. So long as the motion to change the venue for this action is pending, the AG's motion for preliminary injunction should not proceed.

A motion to change venue stays proceedings and must be decided before a court can take any other steps in the case. (See *Pickwick Stages System v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County* (1934) 138 Cal.App.448, 449.) It is the long-established rule that the stay resulting from the pending transfer motion suspends a trial court's jurisdiction to decide other motions. (*Brady v. Times-Mirror Co.* (1895) 106 Cal. 56, 61-62.) Rulings issued while a motion to transfer is pending, including on motions for preliminary injunctive relief, are void. (See *County of Riverside v. Superior Court of San Diego County* (1968) 69 Cal.2d 828, 831 [temporary restraining order and order to show cause set aside pending hearing of a motion to transfer].)

If Westlands' motion to change venue of this action is granted, then the AG's motion for a preliminary injunction should be decided by the Fresno court following transfer. Only if, and after, the motion to change venue is denied may this Court proceed with the AG's motion for preliminary injunction.

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Westlands Water District

Westlands is a California water district with its main office in Fresno, California. (Declaration of Jose Gutierrez ["Gutierrez Dec."], ¶ 2.) It was created and is operating pursuant to the California Water Code. (Wat. Code §§ 37800 et seq.; Gutierrez Dec. at ¶ 2.) Westlands is responsible for providing water to approximately 614,000 acres of land in western Fresno and Kings counties. (Gutierrez Dec. at ¶ 2.) Growers in Westlands produce more than sixty high-quality food and fiber crops on some of the most highly productive farmlands in the world. (*Ibid.*) In addition to providing irrigation for farms, Westlands provides water for municipal and industrial uses, including 1844148.5 2010-096

Naval Air Station Lemoore. (*Ibid.*) Westlands' irrigation water need varies, and historically was in the range of 1.4 million acre-feet per year. (*Id.* at \P 3.)

Westlands has a contract with the United States for delivery of water produced by the federal Central Valley Project ("CVP"). (*Ibid.*) CVP water is the principal source of water Westlands supplies to its farmers. (*Ibid.*) Shasta Dam and Reservoir were constructed as integral elements of the CVP, with Shasta Reservoir representing about forty percent of the total reservoir storage capacity of the CVP and about 55 percent of the total annual CVP supply. (*Id.* at ¶ 9.) Reclamation operates Shasta Dam and Reservoir, in conjunction with other facilities, to provide flood protection, irrigation and municipal and industrial water supply, maintain navigation flows, protect fish in the Sacramento River and the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta, and generate hydropower. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 3, 9.)

In recent decades, competing demands for CVP water has frustrated the ability of Reclamation to operate CVP facilities, including Shasta Dam and Reservoir, to meet Congressionally authorized and mandated purposes of the CVP. (*Id.* at ¶ 4.) Significant conflict has arisen between operation of Shasta Dam and Reservoir to provide cold water immediately below the Dam for salmon and flow further downstream for other species, particularly the Delta smelt. (*Ibid.*) And, during this period Westlands, like many other CVP contractors, has suffered from declining reliability and quantity of CVP water supplies. (*Id.* at ¶ 5.) In only four years since 1989 has Westlands received a 100 percent allocation of its contractual entitlement to CVP water. (*Ibid.*) Indeed in half the years since Westlands received fifty percent or less of its full contractual entitlement to CVP water. (*Ibid.*) In water years 2014 and 2015, during the drought, Westlands received a zero percent allocation under its CVP contracts. (*Ibid.*) Westlands thus has a strong interest in exploring, and potentially financially supporting, projects that will help restore the ability of Reclamation to operate the CVP to meet its purposes, which include providing water that can be beneficially used by farmers within Westlands. (*Id.* at ¶ 7.)

Those supplies must be cost-effective, however. If the cost of additional supplies is too great for farmers to bear, then Westlands will decline to participate in a project. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 16-17.) For example, after much consideration, in September 2017 the Westlands Board of Directors decided not to participate in the Delta tunnels project known as California WaterFix, based on concerns that 1844148.5 2010-096

the costs to Westlands were not justified by the quantity of additional water supply that project might have made available to Westlands. (Id. at ¶ 18.)

B. Reclamation Is Considering Raising Shasta Dam

The declining ability of Reclamation to operate the CVP for the Congressionally authorized and mandated purposes has led to various studies and proposals and studies relating to CVP facilities and operations. In the mid-1990s, a group of state and federal agencies created the CALFED Program and considered a suite of actions intended to solve problems of ecosystem quality, water supply reliability, and water quality. (*Id.* at ¶ 10.) The state agencies that were part of CALFED included the California Resources Agency, the California Department of Water Resources, the California Department of Fish and Game, and the California State Water Resources Control Board ("State Water Board"). (*Ibid.*) Those agencies, through the CALFED Program, prepared a programmatic environmental impact statement/environmental impact report, which includes enlargement of Shasta Dam and Reservoir. In 2000, CALFED released a Record of Decision that outlined a 30-year plan to improve the Delta's ecosystem, water supply reliability, water quality and levee stability. (*Ibid.*) The CALFED agencies identified enlargement of Lake Shasta as among the actions to be further studied and pursued. (*Ibid.*)

Reclamation has continued investigation of raising Shasta Dam. Reclamation released a Final Feasibility Report and Final EIS in July 2015, for what is called the Shasta Dam Raise Project. (*Id.* at ¶ 11.) Reclamation's Final Feasibility Report, along with a Final EIS, provide the results of various studies, including planning, engineering, environmental, social, economic and financial, and included possible benefits and effects of alternative plans. (*Ibid.*)

In March 2018, Congress appropriated \$20 million for expenditure under the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation ("WIIN") Act (P.L. No. 114-322 (Dec. 16, 2016) 130 Stat. 1627) for further design and pre-construction activities. However, Reclamation has not made a final decision whether to construct the project. (Gutierrez Dec. at ¶ 11.) One of the considerations relevant to Reclamation's decision is whether local agencies are willing to contribute to the costs of raising Shasta Dam. Under section 4007 of the WIIN Act, Reclamation can contribute no more than fifty percent of the cost of the Shasta Dam Raise Project. (P.L. No. 114-322, § 4007(b)(2) (Dec. 16, 1844148.5 2010-096

2016) 130 Stat. 1864.)

C. Westlands Is Considering Whether To Contribute Funding For Reclamation's Project

Westlands is considering whether, along with other public water agencies, it will assume the very limited role of contributing funding for Reclamation's potential project. (Gutierrez Dec. at ¶ 12.) To make that determination, among numerous other considerations, Westlands must: (1) evaluate whether Public Resources Code section 5093.542 precludes Westlands from entering into a cost share agreement, and (2) comply with CEQA. (*Ibid.*)

Westlands' review process is not complete. So far, Westlands has released a Notice of Preparation and an Initial Study. (Id. at ¶ 13.) Westlands has not yet released a draft EIR for public comment. (Id. at ¶ 14.) Westlands has not certified an environmental document or approved a cost share agreement. (Ibid.) Westlands is targeting the end of 2019 as the date for completion of its CEQA review and a decision by the Westlands Board of Directors regarding whether it can and whether it should contribute funding. (Ibid.)

Reclamation has issued an anticipated schedule for the Shasta Dam Raise Project under which it would identify cost share partners by August 2019. (AG's Request for Judicial Notice in support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction ["AG RJN"], Ex. Q.) If this preliminary injunction were granted and completion of the CEQA review process were delayed into 2020, it is unknown whether the opportunity for Westlands to be a cost share partner would still be available. (*Id.* at ¶ 14.) Injunction delay could effectively prevent Westlands from becoming a cost share partner, and perhaps jeopardize the entire project, even if Westlands ultimately prevails on the merits after trial.

IV. STANDARD FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

To obtain a preliminary injunction, the AG must demonstrate: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; and (2) a significant threat of irreparable harm. (See *Common Cause of Cal. v. Bd. of Supervisors* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 432, 441-442.) Both of these factors must be proved, as the lack of one of them justifies denying the injunction. (See *Jessen v. Keystone Sav. & Loan Ass'n* (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 454, 459; *S.F. Newspaper Printing Co. v. Superior Court* (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 438, 442 (a preliminary injunction must not issue unless it is "reasonably probable that the moving party 1844148.5 2010-096

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evail on the merits").) Thus, while the Court's determination is "guided by a 'mix' of the al-merit and interim-harm factors . . . [the] court may not grant a preliminary injunction, ess of the balance of interim harm, unless there is some possibility that the plaintiff would ely prevail on the merits of the claim." (Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 678.) rden of proof is on the AG to demonstrate all of the necessary elements to support the issuance eliminary injunction. (See, e.g., Casmalia Res., Ltd. v. Cty. of Santa Barbara (1987) 195 p.3d 827, 838.) In carrying his burden, the AG "must present sufficient evidentiary facts to sh a likelihood that [he] will prevail." (Tahoe Keys Property Owners' Ass'n v. State Water ontrol Bd. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1459, 1478.)

ARGUMENT

Injunctive Relief Should Be Denied Because The AG Is Unlikely To Prevail On A. The Merits

1. Westlands' Study Of Potential Environmental Impacts Under CEQA Is Not "Planning" Prohibited By Public Resources Code Section 5093.542

Subdivision (c) of Public Resources Code section 5093.542 prohibits a state agency from ing] or cooperat[ing] with, whether by loan, grant, license, or otherwise, any agency of the state, or local government in the planning or construction of any dam, reservoir, diversion, or other water impoundment facility that could have an adverse effect on the free-flowing condition of the McCloud River, or on its wild trout fishery." Westlands' activities do not violate this statute.

Contrary to the AG's argument, Westlands is not assisting or cooperating in the "planning" of the Shasta Dam Raise Project. Westlands is only considering whether, along with other public water agencies, it can/will contribute funds for Reclamation's project. (Gutierrez Dec. at ¶ 12.) To date, Westlands has not made a decision whether to contribute funding.² Under any reasonable

²⁴ The AG does not contend that Westlands is participating in "construction" of the Shasta Dam Raise Project. 25

² The AG cites an expired March 2014 Agreement in Principle between Westlands and Reclamation (Motion, 8 at fn.1, and p. 13; AG RJN Ex. D) as supposed planning, but that agreement is only for "potential" cost sharing between Westlands and Reclamation, and provides that each party "may" be willing to enter formal negotiations, subject to a number of contingencies that have not occurred. That agreement expired by its terms on September 30, 2017 and has not been renewed. (Gutierrez Dec. at ¶ 15.) 1844148.5 2010-096

1844148.5 2010-096

construction of subdivision 5093.542(c), Westlands' efforts to gather information to inform its own decision is not a violation of the statute.

The AG contends that Westlands' efforts to comply with CEQA before making a decision regarding funding is "planning" prohibited by section 5093.542. (Motion, 13-14.) For this assertion, it relies on CEQA Guideline 15004(b). (Motion, 14:6-9 [also citing *Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of California* (1988) 47 Cal.3d 376].) But Guideline 15004(b) simply says that CEQA documents should be prepared "as early as feasible in the planning process," not that CEQA review is itself a planning process. And in any event, Westlands' CEQA review is to inform Westlands' decision whether to contribute funding. Westlands is not planning the Shasta Dam Raise Project. Whether and how Shasta Dam will be enlarged is something only Reclamation will decide.

The AG's position in this case that performing CEQA review related to enlargement of Shasta Dam violates section 5093.542 is contradicted by activities of other state agencies in the CALFED Program, described above. State agencies including the California Resources Agency (now the California Natural Resources Agency), the California Department of Water Resources, the California Department of Fish and Game (now the California Department of Fish and Wildlife), and the State Water Board participated in preparation of an EIR that identified enlargement of Shasta Dam as a project warranting further study and consideration as a means to achieve program's goals. (Request for Judicial Notice ["RJN"], Ex. 1.)

More recently, some of these state agencies have also provided comments on an Environmental Impact Study issued by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") for relicensing of PG&E's McCloud-Pit Hydroelectric Project. (RJN, Ex. 2, at pp. A2-A3.) And, the State Water Board recently issued its own draft initial study and negative declaration pursuant to CEQA for the PG&E project on the McCloud River, and it received numerous comment letters arguing that the project will have adverse impacts on the McCloud River. (RJN, Exs. 3, 4, 5.) The position advocated by the AG in this case is inconsistent with those agencies commenting on FERC's EIS regarding relicensing, and the State Water Board's preparation of a CEQA document for its certification related to relicensing.

In a footnote, the AG argues that Westlands' preparation of an EIR pursuant to CEQA indicates it has already made a decision to contribute funding to the Shasta Dam Raise Project. (Motion, 14 fn. 3.) For this assertion, it relies on CEQA Guideline 15002(e), which says an agency is required to comply with CEQA when it "proposes to approve or carry out the activity." (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15002, subd.(e).) The AG's position that Westlands' preparation of an EIR means it has already made a decision is a remarkable distortion of CEQA. As Laurel Heights explains "[t]he EIR is . . . 'the heart of CEQA.'" (Laurel Heights, 47 Cal.3d at p. 392.) "An EIR is an environmental alarm bell whose purpose is to alert the public and its responsible officials to environmental changes before they have reached the ecological points of no return. . . . If CEQA is scrupulously followed, the public will know the basis on which its responsible officials either approve or reject environmentally significant action, and the public, being duly informed, can respond accordingly to action with which it disagrees." (Id. at p. 392 [citations omitted; emphasis added].) Under CEQA, preparation of an EIR necessarily precedes any project determination, and that determination may be a rejection of a project. Under the AG's position Westlands cannot prepare an EIR unless it has already made a decision. But Westlands cannot comply with CEQA if it makes a decision without first preparing an EIR. The AG is wrong on CEQA.

The AG's complaint and motion seem to suggest Westlands must accept as definitive the conclusory statements the AG cites from Reclamation's EIS and Feasibility Study, and from the comment letters by other agencies. CEQA, however, requires that a "final EIR reflect[] the lead agency's *independent* judgment and analysis." (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15090, subd.(a)(3) [emphasis added].) Westlands is fulfilling its duty by studying the potential impacts of Reclamation's project, and by independently determining *whether* it may be a cost share partner in that project. Those impacts are not predetermined and definite, no matter how many times the AG repeats the conclusory, hearsay statements on which his motion relies. The AG concedes that CEQA responsible agencies have a duty to make independent findings regarding any potential impacts of a project. (Motion, 16: 20 [referencing Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15096, subd.(h)].) That is no less true for Westlands as a CEQA lead agency.

In sum, Westlands' ongoing CEQA review is not "planning" prohibited by section 5093.542.

Under CEQA, preparation of an EIR is instead a necessary predicate for a decision by Westlands whether to contribute funding for the Shasta Dam Raise Project. The AG therefore is not likely to prevail on his claims that Westlands is violating section 5093.542.

2. The AG Has Failed To Carry His Burden Of Proving That Raising Shasta Dam Could Adversely Affect The Free-Flowing Condition Of The McCloud River Or Its Wild Trout Fishery

The AG has failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits for another reason. The AG has failed to prove that the Shasta Dam Raise Project could adversely affect the "free-flowing condition" of the McCloud River, or its "wild trout fishery," within the meaning of Public Resources Code section 5093.542(c).

The only evidence offered by the AG in support of his motion is a collection of documents for which he requests judicial notice as official acts of either federal or state agencies, or by Westlands, pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (c). (See AG RJN.) But judicial notice of an official act or record, where proper, extends only to existence of the act or record and not to truth of any statement therein. (*Arce v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.* (2010) 181 Cal. App. 4th 471, 482 ["While we may take judicial notice of court records and official acts of state agencies (Evid. Code, § 452, subds. (c), (d)), the truth of matters asserted in such documents is not subject to judicial notice"].)

At pages 10 through 13 of its memorandum, the AG offers various statements in some of the documents for the truth of the matters asserted, as supposed proof that raising Shasta Dam would adversely affect the "free-flowing condition" of the McCloud River, or its "wild trout fishery." The AG cites to statements in portions of Reclamation's Final EIS (AG RJN, Ex. A), Reclamation's Final Feasibility Report (AG RJN, Ex. C), a report by the US Fish & Wildlife Service (AG RJN, Ex. G), and two comment letters by the California Department of Fish and Wildlife (AG RJN, Exs. H and I). These statements are inadmissible hearsay. (Evid. Code, § 1200.) Therefore, these statements cannot be relied upon by this Court as evidence that the Shasta Dam Raise Project could adversely affect the free-flowing conditions of the McCloud River or its wild trout fishery. The AG has failed to prove a likelihood of success on the merits with evidence that would be admissible in court, and hence his motion must be denied, on this ground as well.

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Westlands has not yet determined whether the Shasta Dam Raise Project would adversely affect the free-flowing condition of the McCloud River, or its wild trout fishery. Westlands will not make that determination until it completes the ongoing environmental review. The AG's motion presumes it is foregone conclusion that raising Shasta Dam would adversely affect the "free-flowing condition" of the McCloud River, and its "wild trout fishery," but in reality that determination is not so simple, both as a matter of law and fact. Here, we identify only a few of the issues involved.

First, Public Resources Code section 5093.52, subdivision (d) defines "free-flowing" for

purposes of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act as "existing or flowing without artificial impoundment,

diversion, or other modification of the river . . . " The portion of the McCloud River that would be

newly inundated if Shasta Reservoir reached a higher elevation does not meet this definition. Flows

in the twenty-three miles of the McCloud River immediately upstream of Shasta Reservoir are the

product of how much water is released by the McCloud Dam, part of Pacific Gas & Electric's

McCloud-Pit Hydroelectric Project. (Declaration of Mary Paasch ["Paasch Dec."], ¶ 5-9.) PG&E

uses McCloud Dam to divert a majority of the flow of the McCloud River at McCloud Dam through

a tunnel to the Pit River, to generate hydropower. (Paasch Dec. at ¶ 7.) A project cannot have an

adverse effect on the "free-flowing condition" of the McCloud River in a reach of the River that is

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not "free-flowing" as that term is defined by the Act.

Second, section 5093.542(c) does not prohibit all effects; it applies only to an "adverse effect." What type or level of effect qualifies as adverse is not defined by the statute. The periodic, temporary inundation of a relatively small additional portion of the lower McCloud River, up to about 3,550 feet of the McCloud River above the existing Shasta Lake full pool below McCloud Dam, for a few months in some years may not rise to the level of an "adverse" effect on free-flowing condition.

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Third, the AG makes no showing that newly inundating a relatively small portion of the lower McCloud River for a few months in some years will have an adverse effect on the "wild trout fishery." A "fishery" connotes catching fish, and generally a particular location for doing so.

(Webster's 3d New Internat. Dict. (2002) p. 858; *see also* Fish & G. Code § 7650(c); 16 U.S.C. § 1802(13).) There is no public access for fishing along the banks of the portion of the lower McCloud River that would be newly inundated. Westlands owns that property. (Gutierrez Dec. at ¶ 18) Fishing along the first seven miles of river above Shasta Reservoir is limited, with a maximum of twenty guests and sixteen rods at a time. (*Id.* at ¶ 19.) In those limited months of certain years when an additional 3,550 feet of the McCloud River are newly inundated, people fishing on Westlands' property would still have at least 31,680 feet of the McCloud River to fish. (*Id.* at ¶ 20.)

In sum, the AG is not likely to prevail on the merits. Westlands' CEQA review is not "planning" prohibited by Public Resources Code section 5093.542(c). And, the AG has failed to prove that raising Shasta Dam could adversely affect the "free-flowing condition" of the McCloud River, or adversely affect its "wild trout fishery," within the meaning of Public Resources Code section 5093.542(c). Preliminary injunctive relief must therefore be denied.

B. <u>Injunctive Relief Should Be Denied Because The AG Has Failed To Show</u> <u>Injunctive Relief Is Needed To Avoid Irreparable Harm</u>

The AG makes three claims of irreparable harm if the Court denies his request for a preliminary injunction: (1) Westlands' supposed violation of Public Resources Code section 5093.542(c) will continue; (2) public agencies will have conflicting duties under CEQA and Public Resources Code section 5093.542(c); and (3) once construction begins the environment will suffer harm. (Motion at pp. 15-19.) None of these arguments suffice to show threatened irreparable harm.

1. The Claimed Violation Of Section 5093.542 Is Not Irreparable Harm

The AG argues that irreparable harm will occur by Westlands' supposed continued violation of Public Resources Code section 5093.542(c). That argument fails. Westlands is not violating Public Resources Code section 5093.542(c), as explained above. Further, an alleged, ongoing

³ The AG also makes no showing that newly inundating a relatively small portion of the McCloud River in a few months of some years will have any adverse effect on the population of wild trout that supports the "wild trout fishery." The current population of wild trout in the McCloud River has thrived under existing conditions, which include fluctuating levels of Lake Shasta that inundate a portion of the lower McCloud River. There is no obvious reason why the occasional inundation of slightly more of the McCloud River would have any perceptible adverse effect on that wild trout population.

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violation of section 5093.542(c) is not sufficient to support preliminary injunctive relief. The AG must demonstrate both irreparable harm and a likelihood of success on the merits. (Jessen, supra, 142 Cal.App.3d at p. 459.) The AG cannot collapse these two factors and avoid a separate showing of harm by arguing that the alleged violation of a statute is itself irreparable harm supporting injunctive relief. (Cohen v. Bd. of Supervisors (1986) 178 Cal. App. 3d 447, 453-454 ["bare showing that public funds are about to be expended in an unconstitutional or otherwise illegal manner" does not trigger a presumption of irreparable injury; such presumption would improperly negate balancing of harms by equating the showing of illegality with harm].)

The AG's reliance on a rebuttable presumption of "public harm" from the violation of a statute is misplaced. A rebuttable presumption of harm to the public interest arises only where a statute "specifically provide[s] injunctive relief for a violation of [that] statute or ordinance," and the government demonstrates it is likely to prevail on the merits. (IT Corp. v. County of Imperial (1983) 35 Cal.3d 63, 71.) In contrast to the zoning ordinance at issue in *IT Corp.*, nothing in section 5093.542, nor any provision of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, section 5093.50 et seq., specifically provides for injunctive relief. (Compare IT Corp., supra, 35 Cal.3d. at p. 70; compare also People ex rel. Feuer v. FXS Management, Inc., (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1154, 1157 [ordinance at issue specifically provided for injunctive relief to restrain illegal marijuana businesses].) Accordingly, the AG's citations to IT Corp. and FXS Management are unavailing; those cases do not support a rebuttable presumption of public harm to support injunctive relief here.

> 2. Public Agencies Have No Conflicting Duties Under CEQA And Section 5093.542

Next, the AG claims irreparable harm because public agencies are supposedly forced to choose between violating section 5093.542 or failing their duties under CEQA. The simple answer is that the AG is misreading section 5093.542. As is explained above, section 5093.542 does not make CEQA compliance illegal. To the extent that responsible agencies will be required by CEQA to make findings and trustee agencies will offer comments in response to Westlands' EIR, doing so is just fulfilling their obligations under CEQA, not irreparable harm warranting injunctive relief.

1844148.5 2010-096

Finally, the AG argues that construction of the Shasta Dam Raise Project will cause irreparable environmental impacts. The potential effects of construction are too remote to support a preliminary injunction. Westlands has not yet made a decision to provide funding for the potential Shasta Dam Raise Project. Indeed, Reclamation has not yet decided whether it will pursue the project, and hence may not proceed even if Westlands or others decide to contribute to the costs. The AG concedes that the "project remains in the planning stages; indeed, federal agencies have studied and considered the project for nearly forty years . . , [and further that] Westlands has not yet committed funding for the project " (Motion, 19:24-26.) These admissions make clear that the potential construction of the Shasta Dam Raise project and its related impacts are far too speculative and attenuated to support enjoining Westlands' CEQA review process. When and if Westlands decides to contribute funding, and Reclamation decides to proceed, the AG will have ample notice of those decision and an opportunity to seek injunctive relief before construction impacts occur.

The AG's citation to *Costa Mesa City Employees Assn. v. City of Costa Mesa* is unavailing. (Motion, 19:5-7 [citing *Costa Mesa* (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 298.].) In *Costa Mesa*, the plaintiff-employee union sued to enjoin the defendant-city's implementation of an outsourcing plan, and associated layoffs of city employees. (*Id.* at p. 301.) The city had already voted to approve the outsourcing plan, had issued layoff notices, and prepared bids and requests for proposals for various vendors. (*Id.* at pp. 302-303.) These facts, most specifically the issuance of layoff notices, were sufficient to demonstrate the irreparable harm necessary for issuance of an injunction. (*Id.* at p. 305.) In this case, Westlands has not made a final determination as to whether it will be a cost share partner for the project, much less taken any steps to effect that determination. *Costa Mesa* only demonstrates how premature the AG's request for injunction and underlying complaint are because Westlands has not made any final determination that is subject to judicial review.

In sum, the AG has failed to show a significant threat of irreparable harm absent injunctive relief, and for this reason too his motion should be denied.

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C. The Balance Of Hardships Weighs Against Injunctive Relief

The proposed injunction would significantly harm Westlands and the public. A preliminary injunction would harm Westlands by enjoining its right to gather and disseminate information and engage the public; the public would be harmed by being denied such information and engagement. Challenges to a CEQA processes are generally grounded in the assertion that the process is incomplete or otherwise deficient. The AG's contention that the entire process here is "illegal" and must be enjoined is confounding, especially when contrasted with its acknowledgement of public agencies' duty to conduct their own independent review. (Motion, 16:18-21.) One may only surmise that the AG does not want Westlands to discover facts and evidence that may support an outcome with which he disagrees. But even if that does occur, the appropriate action would not be to prevent the CEQA review, but to challenge the ultimate determination now duly informed by the completed CEQA process. (*Laurel Heights*, *supra*, 47 Cal.3d at p. 392.)

Halting CEQA review pending a trial in April 2020 would also impose significant additional costs for CEQA consultants. (Paasch Dec. at ¶ 14.) If Westlands' consultant Stantec is forced to stop working on the EIR in late July and allowed to resume in April 2020, Westlands' costs are likely to increase. (*Ibid.*) Such disruption is likely to result in staff turnover, duplication, and other inefficiencies. (*Ibid.*)

Finally, one possible result of Westlands' CEQA review is that it determines it will not to contribute funding to Reclamation's project. If and when Westlands' finally determines to become a cost share partner in a potential Shasta Dam Raise Project the AG may then, "being duly informed. , respond accordingly to action with which [he] disagrees." (*Laurel Heights, supra*, 47 Cal.3d at p. 392.) A suit challenging that determination, and seeking a preliminary injunction then if appropriate, provides the AG with a more than adequate potential remedy.

D. The Form Of Order Proposed By The AG Is Too Indefinite For An Injunction

The Court should deny the AG's motion, for the reasons explained above. If the Court decides to grant preliminary injunctive relief, it should not adopt the form of order submitted by the AG. "An injunction must be definite enough to provide a standard of conduct for those whose activities are proscribed, as well as a standard for the ascertainment of violations of the injunctive 1844148.5 2010-096

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order by the courts called upon to apply it. An injunction which forbids an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application exceeds the power of the court." (*Pitchess v. Super. Ct. of Los Angeles County* (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 644, 651.) Numbered paragraphs 1 and 3 of the form submitted by the AG do not meet these requirements, and Westlands objects to the proposed order on those grounds.

The first numbered paragraph in the proposed order provides: "Westlands is enjoined from assisting or cooperating in any planning for or the construction of the Shasta Dam Raise project, pending trial of this matter." As discussed above, Westlands does not believe that it has engaged in any "planning" of the Project to date. The AG disagrees, and apparently has a far more expansive interpretation of "planning." If the Court issues an injunction, what constitutes prohibited planning should be specifically defined in the order.

The third numbered paragraph in the proposed order provides: "Westlands is enjoined from taking any action that would violate the California Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, Public Resources Code section 5093.542, pending trial of this matter." Westlands has discussed its understanding of section 5093.542 above, and explained that application of the statute is not so simple as the AG's motion presumes. If the Court nonetheless issues an injunction, that injunction should specifically identify what actions Westlands cannot take.

VI. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Westlands respectfully requests the Court deny the AG's motion for preliminary injunction.

DATED: July 16, 2019

KRONICK, MOSKOVITZ, TIEDEMANN & GIRARD A Professional Corporation

By:

Daniel J. O'Hanlon

Attorneys for Defendant and Respondent WESTLANDS WATER DISTRICT

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1 PROOF OF SERVICE People, et al. v. Westlands Water District, et al. 2 Shasta County Superior Court Case No. 192487 3 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 4 At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am 5 employed in the County of Sacramento, State of California. My business address is 400 Capitol Mall, 27th Floor, Sacramento, CA 95814. 6 On July 16, 2019, I served true copies of the following document(s) described as DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT WESTLANDS WATER DISTRICT'S 7 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION 8 **FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION** on the interested parties in this action as follows: 9 SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST 10 **BY FEDEX:** I enclosed said document(s) in an envelope or package provided by FedEx and addressed to the persons at the addresses listed in the Service List. I placed the envelope or package for collection and overnight delivery at an office or a regularly utilized drop box of FedEx or delivered such document(s) to a courier or driver authorized by FedEx to receive documents. 12 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the 13 foregoing is true and correct. 14 Executed on July 16, 2019, at Sacramento, California. 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION